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Abstract
This paper shows that the BB84 protocol with random privacy ampli-
fication is secure with a higher key rate than Mayers’ estimate with the
same error rate. Consequently, the tolerable error rate of this protocol is
increased from 7.5 % to 11 %. We also extend this method to the case
of estimating error rates separately in each basis, which enables us to se-
curely share a longer key.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution, BB84, random privacy amplifi-
cation, security analysis
1 Introduction
The BB84 protocol is the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, which
was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. Unlike conventional cryp-
tographies that rely on the conjectured difficulty of computing certain functions,
the security of QKD is guaranteed by the postulate of quantum mechanics. In
the BB84 protocol, the participants (Alice and Bob) agree on a secret key about
which any eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain little information. The security proof
of this protocol against arbitrary eavesdropping strategies was first proved by
Mayers [5], and a simple proof was later shown by Shor and Preskill [2]. Later,
many security analyses are studied [6, 7, 8, 14, 15].
In the BB84 protocol, two linear codes C1 and C2 are employed to share
a secret key. C1 is used for error correction, and C2 is used for privacy am-
plification. Error correction is performed to share the same key, which is not
∗Part of this paper will be presented in the 2005 International Symposium on Information
Theory, Adelaide Convention Centre, Adelaide, Australia, 4–9 September, 2005.
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necessarily secret. Privacy amplification is performed to extract a shorter se-
cret key. To share the same secret key, C2 must be a subcode of C1, and the
decoding error probability of C1 and C
⊥
2 as a CSS code must be small. For the
key distribution protocol to be practical, we require the linear code C1 to be
efficiently decodeable. However, it is difficult to find a pair of linear codes C1
and C2 that satisfy these conditions. Because we do not have to decode C
⊥
2 ,
it is sufficient that C⊥2 is a randomly chosen code whose decoding error prob-
ability is small with the maximum likelihood decoding. Mayers showed that if
one determines C1 and chooses C2 with rate H(2p) at random from subcodes
of C1, the minimum Hamming weight of C
⊥
2 \C⊥1 is greater than pn with high
probability, where p is an estimated error rate and H(·) is the binary entropy
function [5, Lemma 4]. Consequently, the decoding error probability of C⊥2 as a
part of a CSS code is small. With this method, we can share a key with the key
rate 1−H(p)−H(2p), and the protocol can tolerate error rates up to 7.5%. In
this paper, we call the random privacy amplification as the method such that
one chooses C2 at random from subcodes of a fixed code C1 and performs the
privacy amplification by C2.
However, by evaluating directly the decoding error probability of C⊥2 instead
of the minimum Hamming weight, we can decrease the rate of C2 while main-
taining the security of the protocol. This paper shows that when one chooses C2
with rate H(p) at random from subcodes of C1, the decoding error probability of
C⊥2 as a part of a CSS code is exponentially small with high probability. Conse-
quently, when we choose a code C2 at random in the BB84 protocol, according
to our evaluation of decoding error probability, we can share a key with the key
rate 1− 2H(p) and the protocol can tolerate error rates up to 11%.
To share a key more efficiently, it is known that we should estimate error
rates, p0 and p1, separately in two basis {|0〉, |1〉} and { |0〉+|1〉√2 ,
|0〉−|1〉√
2
} [6, 7,
8, 14]. This paper also shows that if one chooses C2 of a rate
H(p0)+H(p1)
2 at
random from subcodes of C1, the decoding error probability of C
⊥
2 as a part of
a CSS code is exponentially small with high probability, which is proved by an
analogue method in [6, Appendix B].
It is also known that QKD protocols with two-way classical communications
can tolerate higher error rate than QKD protocols with one-way classical com-
munications. The tolerable error rates are 18.9% in [7], 20% in [11], and 26%
in [10]. Our result on random privacy amplification is also applicable for those
protocols, because they perform error correction and privacy amplification after
reducing the error rate with two-way classical communications.
We stress that our result is different from previously known results. In [5,
Lemma 4], it is proved that if we fix C1 of rate 1−H(p) and choose its subcode
C2 of rate H(2p) at random, the BB84 protocol is secure, which means that
the BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification can tolerate the error
rate of 7.5%. In [2], the authors state that there exists a pair of C1 and C2
by which the BB84 protocol can tolerate the error rate of 11%. However, one
cannot guarantee that C1 is efficiently decodeable. They also cite [5, Lemma
4] in order to show that we can securely choose a random subcode C2 of an
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efficiently decodeable code C1. However, it is not clarified in [2] whether or
not the BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification can tolerate the 11%
error rate. Other previous papers [6, 7, 8, 14, 15] are based on the result in
[2]. Thus nobody has proved that the BB84 protocol with random privacy
amplification can tolerate the 11% error rate. We also stress that the random
hashing method cannot be directly applied to the security proof of the BB84
protocol with random privacy amplification as used in [16], because a fixed C1
and the condition C2 ⊂ C1 decrease the randomness of hashing. Application
of the random hashing to a security proof of the random privacy amplification
requires a careful argument similar to Section 3 of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the BB84
protocol, and present the required conditions on C1 and C2. We also relate
those conditions to the security of the BB84 protocol quantitatively. In Section
3, the main theorem is proved. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
2 The BB84 protocol
We consider the following BB84 protocol modified from [2]. As shown in
[6, 7, 8, 14], we estimate error rates separately in two basis {|0〉, |1〉} and
{ |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |0〉−|1〉√
2
}. As is also mentioned in [2, 6, 7], Alice and Bob agree on a
random permutation π after transmission of the qubits and use the linear codes
scrambled by π, where π scrambles the n-bit vector within first n2 bits and latter
n
2 bits respectively, i.e., π : (x1, · · · , xn2 , y1, · · · , yn2 ) 7→ (xpi1(1), · · · , xpi1(n2 ), ypi2(1),· · · , ypi2(n2 )), and π1, π2 ∈ Sn2 are permutations on {1, · · · , n2 }. By this proce-
dure, we can securely share a key against general eavesdropping attacks with a
linear code whose decoding error probability as a part of a CSS code is small
over a BSC (Binary Symmetric Channel) [7, Lemmas 2, 3].
2.1 The BB84 protocol
(1) Alice randomly select (4 + θ)n-bit strings k and a, and chooses a random
permutation π.
(2) Alice repeats the following procedures for 1 ≤ i ≤ (4 + θ)n. If ai = 0, she
creates either state |0〉 for ki = 0 or |1〉 for ki = 1. If ai = 1, she creates
either state |+〉 for ki = 0 or |−〉 for ki = 1. We represent prepared states
as |ϕi〉, where ϕi ∈ {0, 1,+,−}, |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉2 , |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉2 .
(3) Alice sends the resulting (4 + θ)n qubits |ϕ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕ(4+θ)n〉 to Bob.
(4) Bob receives the (4 + θ)n qubits |ϕ˜1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕ˜(4+θ)n〉.
(5) Bob randomly select (4 + θ)n-bit string b.
(6) Bob repeats the following procedures for 1 ≤ i ≤ (4 + θ)n. If bi = 0, he
measures |ϕ˜i〉 with σz. If bi = 1, he measures |ϕ˜i〉 with σx. Then, measure-
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ment result, +1 and −1, corresponds to k˜i = 0 and k˜i = 1, respectively.
After these procedures Bob will obtain k˜ = (k˜1, · · · , k˜(4+θ)n).
(7) Alice announces a and π.
(8) If ai 6= bi, Alice and Bob discard i-th bit of k and k˜. With high probability,
at least 2n bits remain, and there are at least n bits where ai = bi = 0,
and there are at least n bits where ai = bi = 1 (if not, abort the protocol).
(9) Alice chooses n bits where ai = bi = 0, and divides them into two
n
2 -bit
strings, c0 and d0. She chooses n bits where ai = bi = 1, and divides them
into two n2 -bit strings, c1 and d1. Alice announces which bits are c0, d0,
c1, d1. Then, Bob will obtain c˜0 = c0 + e0, c˜1 = c1 + e1 d˜0 = d0 + f0,
d˜1 = d1+f1, where e0, e1, f0, f1 are errors caused by eavesdropping and
channel noise.
(10) Alice and Bob compare d0 with d˜0 and d1 with d˜1, then they obtain f0
and f1. From f0,f1, Alice and Bob choose a pair of linear codes C1 and
C2 that satisfy the conditions (a)–(c) in Section 2.2. If there exists no
such a pair of linear codes, then they abort the protocol.
(11) Alice chooses a random codeword v from π(C1) whose length is n, where
π(C1) is a code that all codewords in C1 are permuted by π. She sends
x = v + c with a public classical channel, where c is a concatenation of
c0 and c1.
(12) Bob receives x = v + c and subtracts c˜ from it. Then, he corrects v + e
to a codeword vˆ in π(C1), where e is a concatenation of e0 and e1, and c˜
is a concatenation of c˜0 and c˜1.
(13) Alice uses the coset of v + π(C2) as a key, and Bob uses the coset of
vˆ + π(C2) as a key.
2.2 Security of the protocol
The security of the BB84 protocol can be proved by showing the security of the
CSS code protocol (QKD using a CSS code) [6]. Maintaining the security, the
BB84 protocol is related with the CSS code protocol. This kind of technique
was first used in [2], in which the BB84 protocol is related to the EPP (Entan-
glement Purification Protocol) protocol. If C1 and C2 satisfy the following three
conditions, then a shared key is secure against general eavesdropping attacks.
(a) C2 ⊂ C1
(b) If the crossover probability of first n2 bits of the BSC are smaller than or
equal to p0 and the crossover probability of latter
n
2 bits are smaller than
or equal to p1, then the decoding error probability of C1 as a part of a
CSS code over the BSC, whose formal definition is given in Definition 2,
is smaller than or equal to ǫ.
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(c) If the crossover probability of first n2 bits of the BSC are smaller than or
equal to p1 and the crossover probability of latter
n
2 bits are smaller than
or equal to p0, then the decoding error probability of C
⊥
2 as a part of a
CSS code over the BSC is smaller than or equal to ǫ.
We set p0 and p1 to p0 = Qf0(1)+ δ and p1 = Qf1(1)+ δ in step (10), where
Qf0 , Qf1 are the types of f0,f1 (refer to [9] for the definition of the type), and δ
and ǫ are sufficiently small positive numbers. Throughout this paper, we assume
p0 <
1
2 and p1 <
1
2 .
We stress that the decoding error probability of C1 and C
⊥
2 have to be small
over any BSC with crossover probability below p0 and crossover probability
below p1, instead of a single BSC with crossover probabilities p0 and p1. The
necessity of such a requirement on decoding error probability is already observed
in [6], [7, Proof of Lemma 3].
The security of the BB84 protocol is usually evaluated by the mutual in-
formation between a shared key and Eve’s accessible information. In order to
implement the BB84 protocol, the designer of the system has to find a pair of
linear codes by which the mutual information between a shared key and Eve’s
accessible information is smaller than an acceptable level. To find such a pair of
linear codes, we need a criterion according to which we can distinguish whether
a particular pair of linear codes makes the mutual information smaller than an
acceptable level.
In the security proof of [7], it is proved that the security of the BB84 pro-
tocol against general eavesdropping attack is reduced to the security against
uncorrelated Pauli attacks (Eve applies a random Pauli operator independently
on each qubit sent through the channel). However, only a asymptotic upper
bound on the mutual information is proved, and the authors do not present a
sufficient condition for low mutual information on a pair of linear codes of a
finite code length.
In the security proof of [6], Hamada presents a condition on a pair of linear
codes [6, Corollary 2], and proves that the mutual information is upper bounded
quantitatively by a pair of linear codes satisfying that condition. However, that
condition does not aid choosing a suitable linear code, because we cannot easily
decide whether a particular code satisfies it.
By upper bounding the mutual information by a function of the decoding
error probability ǫ, we can find a pair of linear codes that makes the mutual
information smaller than an acceptable level according to the conditions (a)–(c).
Because evaluating an upper bound on the decoding error probability of a code
is not difficult, the conditions (a)–(c) on a pair of linear codes are practically
useful. The following theorem gives an upper bound on the mutual information
as a function of the decoding error probability ǫ.
Theorem 1 If we use linear codes C1 and C2 that satisfy the conditions (a)–
(c) in the BB84 protocol, then the mutual information between a shared key and
Eve’s accessible information (including messages exchanged over the classical
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channel) is upper bounded by
I(U ;E,S)
≤ H
(
2(
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ 2 exp
{−Θ(δ2n)})+ 4n(n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ 4n exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} ,
where the base of exp(·) is 2, Θ(δ2n) is given by
Θ(δ2n) =
δ2
4 ln 2
n− 2 log(n+ 1)− 2,
S denotes the random variable of the information transmitted through the public
classical channel, U denotes the random variable of a shared key, i.e., the coset
of v + π(C2), and E denotes the random variable of Eve’s eavesdropping result
from transmitted qubits.
This theorem is proved in Appendix A. Note that the upper bound of the
mutual information is valid for finite n.
3 Random privacy amplification
To implement the BB84 protocol, we need a linear code C1 to be efficiently
decodeable, which is used for error correction in step (12). Under the conditions
(a)–(c), it is difficult to find a pair of linear codes C1 and C2 of which C1 is
efficiently decodeable. On the other hand, since we do not decode C⊥2 in the
BB84 protocol, we can evaluate the condition (c) with an arbitrary decoding
method. Therefore, first we choose a code C1 that satisfies the condition (b)
and is efficiently decodeable. Then we will find a code C2 that satisfies the
conditions (a) and (c). Given a code C1, choosing a code C2 with the condition
(a) is same as choosing a code C⊥2 that satisfies (a
′) C⊥1 ⊂ C⊥2 .
If we fix a rate R lower than 1−H(p0 + p1) and choose a code C⊥2 of rate R
at random with the condition (a′), with high probability the condition (c) will
be satisfied [5, Lemma 4]. In this section, we will prove that if we fix a rate R
lower than 1− H(p0)+H(p1)2 and choose a code C⊥2 of rate R at random with the
condition (a′), with high probability the condition (c) will be satisfied. Some
ideas used in the proof are borrowed from [3, 4].
We present the main theorem in Section 3.1, and the proof of this theorem
in Section 3.2. Then we consider the key rate of securely shared key in Section
3.3, and compare our result with Mayers’ in Section 3.4.
3.1 The code for privacy amplification
Given a code C⊥1 of dimension r, we consider how to choose a code C
⊥
2 . Fix a
rate R = r+mn < 1− H(p0)+H(p1)2 , and let
Am =
{
C⊥2 ⊂ Fn2 | C⊥2 is a linear space,
dimC⊥2 = r +m, C
⊥
1 ⊂ C⊥2
}
be the set from which we choose a code C⊥2 .
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3.1.1 Minimum conditional entropy decoding
To evaluate the decoding error probability, we employ the minimum conditional
entropy decoding [6, Appendix B]. Let e be an error occurred in n bits binary
vector, Pζ be the type of first
n
2 bits of e, and Pη be the type of latter
n
2 bits of
e. Then we define the conditional entropy of e as
Hc(e) = Hc(Pζ , Pη) =
H(Pζ) + H(Pη)
2
.
In the minimum conditional entropy decoding, we find an estimated error eˆ that
minimizes Hc(eˆ) and has the same syndrome, i.e., eˆH
T
2 = eH
T
2 , where H2 is
parity check matrix of C⊥2 .
3.1.2 The decoding process of a CSS code
We assume that only phase errors occur because we will consider the decoding
process by C⊥2 . Assume that a codeword |v + C2〉 is sent and σ[e]z |v + C2〉 is
received, where
|v + C2〉 = 1|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
|v +w〉 v ∈ C1,
σ[e]z = σ
e1
z ⊗ · · · ⊗ σenz ,
e = (e1, · · · , en).
Compute the syndrome eHT2 and find an estimated error eˆ. Then, apply the
unitary operator σ
[eˆ]
z to σ
[e]
z |v + C2〉 to correct the error. If
σ[e+eˆ]z |v + C2〉 6= |v + C2〉,
a decoding error occurs.
3.1.3 Errors causing decoding errors
We consider when decoding errors occur. Note that the condition eˆHT2 = eH
T
2
is equivalent to e + eˆ ∈ C⊥2 . For a linear code C⊥2 , if there exists a vector eˆ
such that e + eˆ ∈ C⊥2 and Hc(eˆ) ≤ Hc(e), the estimated error is eˆ instead of
e. If the unitary operator σ
[e+eˆ]
z applied to a codeword of a CSS code |v+C2〉,
then we have
σ[e+eˆ]z
1
|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
|v +w〉
=
1
|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
(−1)(v+w)·(e+eˆ)|v +w〉.
If (v +w) · (e + eˆ) = 0 for all v +w ∈ C1, the codeword is left unchanged by
multiplication of σ
[e+eˆ]
z . Because v ∈ C1, w ∈ C2, and C2 ⊂ C1, if e+ eˆ ∈ C⊥1 ,
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then (v +w) · (e + eˆ) = 0. Thus, if e + eˆ ∈ C⊥1 , the errors are not estimated
correctly but the received state will be corrected to the original state, and these
errors do not yield decoding errors. In case of decoding a CSS code, we define
the set of errors for each C⊥2 , which cause decoding errors, as
E(C⊥2 ) =
{
e ∈ Fn2 | ∃eˆ Hc(eˆ) ≤ Hc(e), e+ eˆ ∈ C⊥2 \C⊥1
}
.
Definition 2 We define the decoding error probability of C⊥2 as a part of a CSS
code over a BSC whose crossover probability of first n2 bits are p
′
1 and that of
latter n2 bits are p
′
0 as
Perr(C
⊥
2 , p
′
0, p
′
1) =
∑
e∈E(C⊥2 )
Q(e),
where Q(e) is a probability that e occurs in a BSC whose crossover probability
of first n2 bits are p
′
1 and that of latter
n
2 bits are p
′
0.
The decoding error probability of C1 as a part of a CSS code is defined in the
same way considering the decoding process of bit flip errors of a CSS code.
Theorem 3 If we choose a code C⊥2 at random from Am, for arbitrary µ > 0,
we have
Pr
{
Perr(C
⊥
2 , p
′
0, p
′
1) ≤ (
n
2
+ 1)42−n(E(R,p0,p1)−µ)
∀p′0 ≤ p0, p′1 ≤ p1
}
≥ 1− (n
2
+ 1)22−µn,
where
E(R, p0, p1) =
min
q0,q1
[
D(q1|p1) +D(q0|p0)
2
+ |1−R−Hc(q1, q0)|+
]
,
and |x|+ = max{x, 0}. Note that minq0,q1 is taken over 0 ≤ q0, q1 ≤ 1. Because
D(q1|p1)+D(q0|p0)
2 = 0 only if q1 = p1, q0 = p0, and R < 1− H(p0)+H(p1)2 , we have
E(R, p0, p1) > 0.
Consequently, we can obtain a code C⊥2 that satisfy the condition (c) with
high probability by choosing a code at random from Am.
3.2 Proof of the theorem
Refer to [9] for the method of type used in this section. We also use the notation
T n(Pζ,Pη) as the set of binary vectors whose type of first
n
2 bits is Pζ and that of
latter n2 bits is Pη. P
2
n
2
is the direct product of the sets of all possible types over
{0, 1}n2 , i.e., Pn
2
× Pn
2
.
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We classify E(C⊥2 ) by the types in P 2n
2
as
E(C⊥2 ) =
⋃
(Pζ ,Pη)
E(Pζ ,Pη)(C⊥2 ),
where E(Pζ ,Pη)(C⊥2 ) = E(C⊥2 ) ∩ T n(Pζ,Pη). First, we prove that if we choose a
code C⊥2 at random from Am, C
⊥
2 satisfies the following property with high
probability. Then we prove that the decoding error probability of C⊥2 that
satisfy the following property is small. Given arbitrary µ > 0, for all types
(Pζ , Pη) ∈ P 2n
2
,
|E(Pζ ,Pη)(C⊥2 )|
|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
≤ 2−n(|1−Hc(Pζ ,Pη)−R|+−µ).
To prove this, we evaluate the average of
|E(Pζ,Pη)(C
⊥
2 )|
|Tn
(Pζ,Pη)
| over C
⊥
2 ∈ Am. Define
the set of codes that cannot correct e as
Bm(e) =
{
C⊥2 ∈ Am | e ∈ E(C⊥2 )
}
.
Define Cm(e) as
Cm(e) =
{
C⊥2 ∈ Am | e ∈ C⊥2 \C⊥1
}
and G as the set of bijective linear maps α on Fn2 that satisfies α(C
⊥
1 ) = C
⊥
1 .
Then we have the following equalities:
|Cm(e)|
=
∣∣{C⊥2 ∈ Am | e ∈ C⊥2 \C⊥1 }∣∣
=
∣∣{α(C⊥2 ) | e ∈ α(C⊥2 \C⊥1 ), α ∈ G, C⊥2 is fixed}∣∣
=
∣∣{βα(C⊥2 ) | β(e) ∈ βα(C⊥2 \C⊥1 ), α, β ∈ G,
β and C⊥2 are fixed
}∣∣ .
Since there exists β ∈ G such that e′ = β(e) for arbitrary e and e′ ∈ Fn2\C⊥1 ,
|Cm(e)| does not depend on e ∈ Fn2 \C⊥1 and
|Cm(e)| =
∑
e∈Fn2 \C⊥1 |Cm(e)|
|Fn2\C⊥1 |
=
∑
e∈Fn2 \C⊥1 |{C
⊥
2 ∈ Am | e ∈ C⊥2 \C⊥1 }|
|Fn2 \C⊥1 |
=
∑
C⊥2 ∈Am |{e ∈ F
n
2\C⊥1 | e ∈ C⊥2 \C⊥1 }|
|Fn2\C⊥1 |
=
|C⊥2 \C⊥1 ||Am|
|Fn2\C⊥1 |
.
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From the definition, it is obvious that |Cm(e)| = 0 for e ∈ C⊥1 . Hence
|Cm(e)| ≤ |C
⊥
2 \C⊥1 ||Am|
|Fn2 \C⊥1 |
=
2r+m − 2r
2n − 2r |Am|
=
|Am|
2n−(r+m)
1− 2−m
1− 2−n+r
≤ |Am|
2n−(r+m)
= |Am|2−n(1−R).
Because the condition for C⊥2 ∈ Am to belong to Bm(e) is ∃eˆ Hc(eˆ) ≤
Hc(e), e+ eˆ ∈ C⊥2 \C⊥1 , we obtain
|Bm(e)|
|Am| ≤
1
|Am|
∑
eˆ∈Fn2
Hc(eˆ)≤Hc(e)
|Cm(e+ eˆ)|
≤
∑
eˆ∈Fn2
Hc(eˆ)≤Hc(e)
2−n(1−R),
while |Bm(e)||Am| ≤ 1. Let |x|+ = max{x, 0} and note that if a, b ≥ 0, then min{a+
b, 1} ≤ min{a, 1}+min{b, 1}.
Using above definitions, we have
1
|Am|
∑
C⊥2 ∈Am
|E(Pζ ,Pη)(C⊥2 )|
|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
=
1
|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
∑
e∈Tn
(Pζ,Pη)
|Bm(e)|
|Am|
≤ 1|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
∑
e∈Tn
(Pζ,Pη)
min


∑
eˆ∈Fn2
Hc(eˆ)≤Hc(e)
2−n(1−R), 1


= min


∑
(P ′ζ ,P
′
η)∈P 2n
2
Hc(P
′
ζ
,P ′η)≤Hc(Pζ,Pη)
|T n(P ′
ζ
,P ′η)
|2−n(1−R), 1


≤
∑
(P ′ζ ,P
′
η)∈P 2n
2
Hc(P
′
ζ
,P ′η)≤Hc(Pζ,Pη)
2−n|1−R−Hc(P
′
ζ ,P
′
η)|+
10
≤ |P 2n
2
| max
(P ′ζ ,P
′
η)∈P 2n
2
Hc(P
′
ζ
,P ′η)≤Hc(Pζ,Pη)
2−n|1−R−Hc(P
′
ζ ,P
′
η)|+
≤ (n
2
+ 1)22−n|1−R−Hc(Pζ ,Pη)|
+
Let Ab(µ, Pζ , Pη) and Ag(µ) be
Ab(µ, Pζ , Pη) =
{
C⊥2 ∈ Am
∣∣∣∣∣ |E(Pζ ,Pη)(C
⊥
2 )|
|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
> (
n
2
+ 1)22−n(|1−R−Hc(Pζ ,Pη)|
+−µ)
}
,
Ag(µ) = Am\
⋃
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
Ab(µ, Pζ , Pη).
From the union bound and the Chebychev inequality, we have
|Ag(µ)|
|Am|
= 1−
⋃
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
|Ag(µ, Pζ , Pη)|
|Am|
≥ 1−
∑
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
|Ag(µ, Pζ , Pη)|
|Am|
≥ 1−
∑
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
(n2 + 1)
22−n|1−R−Hc(Pζ ,Pη)|
+
(n2 + 1)
22−n(|1−R−Hc(Pζ ,Pη)|+−µ)
≥ 1− (n
2
+ 1)22−µn
Next, we evaluate the decoding error probability of C⊥2 ∈ Ag(µ). Let p′0 ≤ p0
and p′1 ≤ p1, and Q(e) be a probability that e occurs in a BSC whose crossover
probability of first n2 bits are p
′
1 and that of latter
n
2 bits are p
′
0. Then the
decoding error probability of C⊥2 as a part of a CSS code is
Perr(C
⊥
2 , p
′
0, p
′
1)
=
∑
e∈E(C⊥2 )
Q(e)
=
∑
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
∑
e∈E(Pζ,Pη)(C⊥2 )
Q(e)
=
∑
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
|E(Pζ ,Pη)(C⊥2 )|
|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
Q(T n(Pζ ,Pη))
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≤
∑
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
(
n
2
+ 1)22−n(|1−R−Hc(Pζ ,Pη)|
+−µ)
×2−n2 {D(Pζ(1)|p′1)+D(Pη(1)|p′0)}
≤ (n
2
+ 1)42−n(E(R,p
′
0,p
′
1)−µ),
where
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) =
min
q0,q1
[
D(q1|p′1) +D(q0|p′0)
2
+ |1−R−Hc(q1, q0)|+
]
.
Lemma 4
min
0≤p′0≤p0
0≤p′
1
≤p1
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) = E(R, p0, p1).
We prove this lemma in Appendix B. From this lemma, we have
Perr(C
⊥
2 , p
′
0, p
′
1)
≤ (n
2
+ 1)42−n(E(R,p0,p1)−µ) ∀p′0 ≤ p0, p′1 ≤ p1.
Then Theorem 3 is proved.
3.3 Achievable key rate
We proved that if we fix a code C⊥1 and choose a code C
⊥
2 of a fixed rate
R < 1 − H(p0)+H(p1)2 at random with the condition C⊥1 ⊂ C⊥2 , the decoding
error probability of C⊥2 as a part of a CSS code is small with high probability.
Consequently, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code C2 of
a rate higher than H(p0)+H(p1)2 .
If we estimate an error rate in a lump (test bits in each basis are lumped
together and a single error rate is computed), an estimated error rate is p0+p12
instead of p0 and p1. Thus, we can conduct random privacy amplification with
a code C2 with a rate higher than H
(
p0+p1
2
)
. Since the entropy function is
concave, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code C2 of a
lower rate by estimating error rates separately, which enables us to share a
longer key.
3.4 Comparison with Mayers’ evaluation
In this section, we compare our result with Mayers’. In case of estimating an
error rate in a lump, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code
C2 of a rate higher than H
(
p0+p1
2
)
. Because there exists efficiently decodeable
codes whose rate is fairly close to 1 − H (p0+p12 ) and whose decoding error
12
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Figure 1: Comparison of achievable key rates.
probability is small, we can securely share a key with a rate lower than 1 −
2H
(
p0+p1
2
)
. With Mayers’ evaluation of minimum Hamming weight of C⊥2 \C⊥1
in [5], we can securely share a key with a rate lower than 1−H (p0+p12 )−H(p0+
p1), where 1−H
(
p0+p1
2
)
is the rate of C1 for error correction and H(p0 + p1) is
the rate of C2 for privacy amplification.
According to the evaluation of the decoding error probability, we showed
that the tolerable error rate can be increased from 7.5 % to 11 % in the BB84
protocol with random privacy amplification. Figure 1 shows the secure key rate
of this paper and Mayers’ against error rate, and the key rate falls to 0 at the
point of 7.5 % and 11 % respectively.
4 Conclusion
For a fixed code C1, we showed that we can decrease a rate of randomly chosen
code C2, keeping the BB84 protocol to be secure. Consequently, we proved that
the BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification can tolerate severer noise
and can share longer keys.
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A Proof of theorem 1
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1, i.e., we prove that we can securely share
a key against general eavesdropping attacks with the linear codes C1 and C2
that satisfy the conditions (a)–(c) in Section 2.2. Basic ideas in this proof are
borrowed from [6, 7].
The outline of this proof is similar to the proof in [6]. We introduce a class
of CSS codes and the CSS code protocol in Sections A.1 and A.2 respectively.
Then we define some notations used in this proof in Section A.3. After that,
we define Eve’s attack mathematically and relate the BB84 protocol to the CSS
code protocol in Sections A.4 and A.5 respectively. In Section A.6, in order to
bound the mutual information, we bound the fidelity, which is defined in Section
A.5. Finally, we upper bound the mutual information of a shared key and Eve’s
accessible information in Section A.7 using the result in Section A.6.
A.1 A class of CSS codes
In this section, we define a class of CSS codes. A CSS code Q is constructed
from two linear codes C1 and C2 that satisfy C2 ⊂ C1. A codeword |φu〉 ∈ Q is
|φu〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
w∈C2
|u+w〉,
where u is a coset representative of C1/C2. A class of CSS codes is {Qxz} that
are parametrized by coset representatives x ∈ Fn2/C1 and z ∈ Fn2/C⊥2 , and a
codeword |φuxz〉 ∈ Qxz is
|φuxz〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
w∈C2
(−1)z·w|u+w + x〉.
A recovery operator for a CSS code Qxz is a TPCP (Trace Preserving Com-
pletely Positive) map on L(H⊗n) that represent the measurement of syndrome
and the unitary operation of error correction, where H is a Hilbert space of
dimension 2, and L(H) is the linear space of operators on H. We denote by
Rxz the recovery operator for Qxz.
A.2 The CSS code protocol
To prove the security of the BB84 protocol, we relate the BB84 protocol with
the following CSS code protocol [6, Section 4]. In this section, we use bold large
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letters for random variables and small bold letters for their realizations, e.g., x
denote a realization of a random variable X. We also use a notation Ex as the
expectation operator over X.
Suppose Alice chooses coset representatives u ∈ C1/C2, x ∈ Fn2 /C1, z ∈
Fn2/C
⊥
2 at random and send |φuxz〉. Let An be a TPCP map on L(H⊗n)
representing Eve’s eavesdropping attack, and E be a random variable that is
Eve’s measurement result. According to [12, Section 5.3], we can bound the
mutual information between U and E as
I(U ;E|X = x,Z = z) ≤ Sxz, (1)
where Sxz is the entropy exchange [12, Section 5] after the system suffers a
Eve’s attack An and recovery operator Rxz , i.e.,
Sxz = S(ρ),
ρ = [In ⊗Rxz ]([In ⊗An](|Φxz〉〈Φxz |)),
|Φxz〉 = 1√|C1/C2|
∑
u∈C1/C2
|φuxz〉 ⊗ |φuxz〉,
and S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy. Let Fxz be the entanglement
fidelity of above process, i.e.,
Fxz = 〈Φxz|ρ|Φxz〉.
Then, by the quantum Fano inequality, Eq. (24) of [12, Section 6.2], Sxz is
bounded as
Sxz ≤ H(1− Fxz) + (1 − Fxz)2n, (2)
where H(·) is the binary entropy function. Combining Eqs. (1) and (2) and
taking the average of the both sides over x, z, we have
I(U ;E|X,Z) ≤ H(1− ExzFxz) + (1− ExzFxz)2n, (3)
where we used concavity of entropy function, i.e., ExzH(1 − Fxz) ≤ H(1 −
ExzFxz). From Eq. (27) of [6, Section 5], the entanglement fidelity Fxz is
bounded as
1− ExzFxz ≤
∑
(ex,ez)∈E
P(ex, ez), (4)
where E is the set of uncorrectable errors of a CSS code Q,
P(ex, ez) = 〈Ψnexez |[In ⊗An](|Ψn〉〈Ψn|)|Ψnexez 〉,
|Ψn〉 = 1√
2n
∑
l∈Fn2
|l〉 ⊗ |l〉,
|Ψnexez 〉 =
1√
2n
∑
l∈Fn2
|l〉 ⊗ σ[ex]x σ[ez ]z |l〉.
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A.3 Notation
First, we fix the positions of remaining 2n bits out of (4+θ)n bits in step (9), and
represent these positions by T . Lets aT , bT ∈ F2n2 be the subsequences of a, b
that correspond to T , which include n bits where ai = bi = 0 and n bits where
ai = bi = 1. We further divide the positions T into four blocks, T
k
0 , T
t
0 , T
k
1 , T
t
1 .
T k0 , T
t
0 consist of the positions that ai = bi = 0, and T
k
1 , T
t
1 consist of the posi-
tions that ai = bi = 1. T
k
0 , T
k
1 are the positions used for generating a key, and
T t0 , T
t
1 are the positions used for estimating an error rate. T
k
0 , T
t
0 , T
k
1 , T
t
1 depend
on aT , bT ,pos, where pos represents how to divide the remaining positions T
into the positions T k for generating a key and the positions T t for estimating
an error rate. Note that T k consists of T k0 and T
k
1 , and T
t consists of T t0 and
T t1 .
We also use a notation kT as a subsequence of k ∈ F(4+θ)n2 that corresponds
to T , and kTk0 , kTk1 , kT t0 , kT t1 kTk , kT tare subsequences of kT that corresponds
to T k0 , T
k
1 , T
t
0 , T
t
1 , T
k, T t respectively. Subsequences of c,d, k˜ ∈ F(4+θ)n2 are
defined in the same way.
A.4 Eve’s attack
Let a TPCP map A : L(H⊗(4+θ)n) → L(H⊗(4+θ)n) represent Eve’s eavesdrop-
ping attack (plus channel noise) on transmitted (4 + θ)n qubits. Note that A
does not depend on a, b,pos, π. In the BB84 protocol, Alice chooses (4 + θ)n-
bit string k and sends it with either {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis according to
a, i.e., Alice sends H [a]|k〉, where H [a] = Ha1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ha(4+θ) , and H is a
Hadamard transformation. Bob receives A(H [a]|k〉〈k|H [a]), and measures it
by either {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis according to b and obtain k˜. Note that
[H ⊗H ]|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉, where
|Ψ〉 = |0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉√
2
,
and that we can denote Eve’s attack by a unitary operator on Bob’s system and
Eve’s system H⊗(4+θ)n ⊗HE , i.e.,
UBE [H
[a]|k〉 ⊗ |e0〉],
where |e〉0 is a state in HE , and UBE is an unitary operation on H(4+θ)n⊗HE .
We can mathematically regard Alice’s sent bits k and Bob’s received bits k˜ as
follows. First, Alice and Bob share a bipartite state
|Ψ(4+θ)n〉 = 1√
2(4+θ)n
∑
l∈F(4+θ)n2
H [a]|l〉 ⊗H [a]|l〉
=
1√
2(4+θ)n
∑
l∈F(4+θ)n2
|l〉 ⊗ |l〉.
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Then Bob’s system suffers Eve’s attack and the bipartite state becomes
|ϕABE〉 = (IA ⊗ UBE)[|Ψ(4+θ)n〉 ⊗ |e0〉]
=
1√
2(4+θ)n
∑
l∈F(4+θ)n2
H [a]|l〉 ⊗ UBE(H [a]|l〉 ⊗ |e0〉), (5)
where TrE[|ϕABE〉〈ϕABE |] = [I ⊗ A](|Ψ(4+θ)n〉〈Ψ(4+θ)n|), and TrE [·] denotes
the partial trace overHE . After that, Alice measures her system by the {|0〉, |1〉}
basis or the {|+〉, |−〉} basis according to a, and obtain k ∈ F(4+θ)n2 . This
measurement changes the state in Eq. (5) to
H [a]|k〉 ⊗ UBE [H [a]|k〉 ⊗ |e0〉]. (6)
Then Bob measures his system in Eq. (6) by the {|0〉, |1〉} basis or the {|+〉, |−〉}
basis according to b, and obtain k˜.
Let
P(c,d) = 〈Ψ(4+θ)ncd |[I ⊗ A](|Ψ(4+θ)n〉〈Ψ(4+θ)n|)|Ψ(4+θ)ncd 〉,
where c,d ∈ F(4+θ)n2 . Since Alice and Bob measure the qubits by {|0〉, |1〉} basis
when ai = bi = 0 and by {|+〉, |−〉} basis when ai = bi = 1, we can relate c,d
with k, k˜ as
cT t0 = kT t0 − k˜T t0 = f0
dT t1 = kT t1 − k˜T t1 = f1,
where f0 and f1 are the
n
2 -bit strings from which we estimate error rates.
A.5 Relating the BB84 protocol to the CSS code protocol
In the BB84 protocol, we select the linear codes C1 and C2 that satisfy the
conditions (a)–(c) from f0,f1. We prove that the following protocol is secure.
Alice randomly selects coset representatives u,x, z, where u ∈ π(C1)/π(C2),
x ∈ Fn2/π(C1), z ∈ Fn2/π(C⊥2 ), and u corresponds to a shared key in the BB84
protocol. Then Alice selects |l〉⊗|m〉, where l ∈ Fn2 ,m ∈ F(2+θ)n2 , l corresponds
to test bits, and m corresponds to discarded bits in the BB84 protocol. Then
Alice sends
H [a][|φuxz〉 ⊗ |l〉 ⊗ |m〉]
to Bob, where H [a] = Ha1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Ha(4+θ)n . Bob measures the test qubits, and
Alice and Bob obtain f0,f1. Then, Bob corrects errors and obtain a key.
We consider this procedure as follows. First, Alice and Bob share a bipartite
state
ρ = |Φ′xz〉〈Φ′xz| ⊗ |Ψn〉〈Ψn| ⊗ |Ψ(2+θ)n〉〈Ψ(2+θ)n|,
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where
|Φ′xz〉 = [H [aTk ] ⊗H [aTk ]]|Φxz〉.
Then, Bob’s system suffers a Eve’s attack A, and ρ becomes ρ′. After Alice and
Bob obtain measurement disagreements f0, f1, bipartite state is
ρ′′ =
[I⊗2n ⊗Π(f0,f1)⊗ I⊗(4+2θ)n]ρ′[I⊗2n ⊗Π(f0,f1)⊗ I⊗(4+2θ)n]
Tr
[
[I⊗2n ⊗Π(f0,f1)⊗ I⊗(4+2θ)n]ρ′
] ,
where
Π(f0,f1) =
∑
g0,g1∈F
n
2
2
|Ψf0f1〉〈Ψf0f1 |
|Ψf0f1〉 =
1√
2n
∑
l∈Fn2
|l〉 ⊗ [σ[f0]x σ[g0]z ⊗ σ[g1]x σ[f1]z ]|l〉.
Then Bob perform the recovery operation Rxz , and we have
ρ′′′ = [In ⊗Rxz ⊗ I(6+2θ)n](ρ′′).
We define the entanglement fidelity of the system that corresponds to a shared
key as
Fxz|f0f1aT bTpospi = Tr
[
[|Φ′xz〉〈Φ′xz | ⊗ I⊗(6+2θ)n]ρ′′′
]
. (7)
To bound the mutual information between a shared key and Eve’s eaves-
dropping key, we evaluate Eq. (7) as follows. Since we transmit the qubits in
the {|+〉, |−〉} basis when ai = 1, and from Eq. (4), we can bound Eq. (7) as
1− ExzFxz|f0f1aT bTpospi ≤
∑
(c
Tk
,d
Tk
)∈E
P(cTk ,dTk |f0,f1)
≤
∑
(c
Tk0
,d
Tk1
)∈E(pi(C1))
P(cTk0 ,dTk1 |f0,f1)
+
∑
(c
Tk
1
,d
Tk
0
)∈E(pi(C⊥2 ))
P(cTk1 ,dTk0 |f0,f1), (8)
where E is the set of uncorrectable errors by the CSS code that is constructed
by π(C1) and π(C2), and E(π(C1)), E(π(C⊥2 )) are sets of uncorrectable errors
by π(C1) and π(C
⊥
2 ) as a part of a CSS code respectively. Note that π(C1)
corrects errors caused by σz and π(C
⊥
2 ) corrects errors caused by σx in qubits
transmitted by the {|+〉, |−〉} basis, and that the second inequality is due to
that the decoding error of a CSS code occurs when a bit flip error or a phase
flip error is uncorrectable.
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A.6 Bounding the fidelity
In this section, we evaluate Eq. (8) by taking the average of parameters, a, b, π,f0,f1.
Let fix one realization of (cT ,dT ) and vary aT , bT ,pos at uniformly random.
Note that subsequences cTk0 , cT
t
0
, cTk1 , cT
t
1
, dTk0 ,dT
t
0
,dTk1 ,dT
t
1
of cT ,dT vary ac-
cording to aT , bT ,pos. Using a lemma [6, Lemma 5], we have
Pr
{
|Qc
Tk
0
(1)−Qc
Tt
0
(1)| > δ or |Qd
Tk
1
(1)−Qd
Tt
1
(1)| > δ
}
≤ exp{−Θ(δ2n)}
Pr
{
|Qd
Tk
0
(1)−Qd
Tt1
(1)| > δ or |Qc
Tk
1
(1)−Qc
Tt0
(1)| > δ
}
≤ exp{−Θ(δ2n)} , (9)
where the base of exp(·) is 2, and Θ(δ2n) can be explicitly given as
Θ(δ2n) =
δ2
4 ln 2
n− 2 log(n+ 1)− 2. (10)
For each realization cT t0 = f0,dT t1 = f1, we decide linear codes C1 and C2 that
satisfy the conditions (a)–(c).
First, we consider C1. Assume that C1 is used over a BSC whose crossover
probability of first n2 bits are QcTk0
(1) and that of latter n2 bits are QdTk1
(1).
From the condition (b), if Qc
Tk
0
(1) ≤ Qf0(1) + δ and QdTk
1
(1) ≤ Qf1(1) + δ,
then the decoding error probability of C1 as a part of a CSS code is lower than
or equal to ǫ. We can write the decoding error probability as∑
(Pζ ,Pη)∈P 2n
2
ǫ(Pζ ,Pη)QBSC(T
n
(Pζ ,Pη)
) =
∑
e∈E(C1)
QBSC(e) ≤ ǫ, (11)
where QBSC(e) is a probability that e occurs over a BSC whose crossover prob-
ability of first n2 bits are QcTk0
(1) and that of latter n2 bits are QdTk1
(1), E(C1)
is a set of uncorrectable errors of C1, and ǫ(Pζ ,Pη) is the ratio of uncorrectable
errors in T n(Pζ ,Pη), i.e.,
ǫ(Pζ ,Pη) =
|T n(Pζ ,Pη) ∩ E(C1)|
|T n(Pζ ,Pη)|
.
From Eq. (11), we have
ǫ(Qc
Tk
0
,Qd
Tk1
)QBSC(T
n
(Qc
Tk0
,Qd
Tk
1
)) ≤ ǫ.
Using type property in [9, Lemma 2.6], we have
QBSC(T
n
(Qc
Tk
0
,Qd
Tk1
)) ≥
1
(n2 + 1)
2
2−n
D(Qc
Tk0
|Qc
Tk0
)+D(Q
d
Tk
1
|Q
d
Tk
1
)
2 =
1
(n2 + 1)
2
.
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Thus, we have
ǫ(Qc
Tk
0
,Qd
Tk
1
) ≤ (
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ. (12)
Consequently, if |Qc
Tk0
(1) − Qf0(1)| ≤ δ and |QdTk1 (1) − Qf1(1)| ≤ δ, then
the ratio of uncorrectable errors of C1 in T
n
(Qc
Tk
0
,Qd
Tk
1
) is less than or equal to
(n2 + 1)
2ǫ.
Define J(cTk0 ,dTk1 ,f0,f1, C1) as follows: If (cTk0 ,dTk1 ) ∈ E(C1), J(cTk0 ,dTk1 ,f0,f1, C1) =
1. For the others, J(cTk0 ,dTk1 ,f0,f1, C1) = 0. If Qf0(1) or Qf1(1) is too large
and we abort the BB84 protocol, then J(cTk0 ,dTk1 ,f0,f1, C1) is always 0. Note
that C1 is decided from f0,f1. From Eq. (9), |QTk0 (1) − Qf0(1)| ≤ δ and
|QTk1 (1)−Qf1(1)| ≤ δ with high probability. When e, e′ ∈ T n(Pζ ,Pη), there exist
a permutation π such that π(e) = e′. Thus, if we consider the decoding error
probability of π(C1) averaged over permutation π, then we can consider that an
error with the same type occurs with same the probability. We proved that if
|QTk0 (1)−Qf0(1)| ≤ δ and |QTk1 (1)−Qf1(1)| ≤ δ, then the ratio of uncorrectable
errors of π(C1) in T
n
(Qc
Tk
0
,Qd
Tk1
) is less than or equal to (
n
2 + 1)
2ǫ in Eq. (12).
Then we have
EaT ,bT ,pos,piJ(cTk0 ,dTk1 ,f0,f1, π(C1))
≤ (n
2
+ 1)2ǫPr
{
|Qc
Tk
0
(1)−Qc
Tt
0
(1)| ≤ δ and |Qd
Tk
1
(1)−Qd
Tt
1
(1)| ≤ δ
}
+ Pr
{
|Qc
Tk
0
(1)−Qc
Tt0
(1)| > δ or |Qd
Tk
1
(1)−Qd
Tt1
(1)| > δ
}
≤ (n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} . (13)
Taking the average of Eq. (13) over (cT ,dT ) and exchanging the order of
the averages, we have
EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)
∑
(c
Tk0
,d
Tk1
)∈E(pi(C1))
P(cTk0 ,dTk1 |f0,f1)
= EP(cT ,dT )EaT ,bT ,pos,piJ(cTk0 ,dTk1 ,f0,f1, π(C1))
≤ (n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} . (14)
In the same way, we have
EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)
∑
(c
Tk1
,d
Tk0
)∈E(pi(C⊥2 ))
P(cTk1 ,dTk0 |f0,f1) ≤ (
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} . (15)
From Eq. (14) and (15), we can rewrite Eq. (8) as
1− EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)ExzFxz|f0f1aT bTpospi ≤ 2(
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ 2 exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} . (16)
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A.7 Bounding the mutual information
Using Eq. (3), we can bound the mutual information as
I(U ;E|X,Z,AT ,BT ,POS,Π ,F0,F1)
≤ EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)H
(
1− ExzFxz|f0f1aT bTpospi
)
+EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)(1− ExzFxz|f0f1aT bTpospi)2n
≤ H (1− EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)ExzFxz|f0f1aT bTpospi)
+(1− EaT ,bT ,pos,piEP(f0,f1)ExzFxz|f0f1aT bTpospi)2n
≤ H
(
2(
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ + 2 exp
{−Θ(δ2n)})
+4n(
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ 4n exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} , (17)
where X, Z, AT , BT , POS, Π , F0, F1 denote the random variables of x, z,
aT , bT , pos, π, f0, f1. Using the chain rule of mutual information [13, Theorem
2.5.2] and mutual independence of U from X, Z, AT , BT , POS, Π , F0, F1,
we can upper bound the mutual information of the shared key and Eve’s all
accessible information as
I(U ;E,X,AT ,BT ,POS,Π ,F0,F1)
≤ I(U ;E,X,Z,AT ,BT ,POS,Π ,F0,F1)
= I(U ;E|X,Z,AT ,BT ,POS,Π ,F0,F1)
≤ H
(
2(
n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ 2 exp
{−Θ(δ2n)})+ 4n(n
2
+ 1)2ǫ+ 4n exp
{−Θ(δ2n)} ,
where Θ(δ2n) is given by Eq. (10).
B Proof of lemma 4
In this appendix, we prove
min
0≤p′
0
≤p0
0≤p′1≤p1
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) = E(R, p0, p1),
where we assume p0 <
1
2 and p1 <
1
2 . First, we fix p
′
0 and p
′
1 arbitrary in the
range 0 ≤ p′0 ≤ p0, 0 ≤ p′1 ≤ p1, and analyze E(R, p′0, p′1) as a function of R in
Section B.1. Then we prove that E(R, p′0, p
′
1) takes the minimum at p
′
0 = p0,
p′1 = p1 for arbitrary 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 in Section B.2.
B.1 Analysis of E(R, p′0, p
′
1)
Note that p′0 and p
′
1 are arbitrary fixed in the range 0 ≤ p′0 ≤ p0, 0 ≤ p′1 ≤ p1
in this section. To express E(R, p′0, p
′
1) as a function of R, p
′
0, p
′
1 explicitly, we
define
F (R, q0, q1) =
{
D(q0|p′0)+D(q1|p′1)
2 + 1−R− H(q0)+H(q1)2 for H(q0)+H(q1)2 < 1−R
D(q0|p′0)+D(q1|p′1)
2 for
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 ≥ 1−R.
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Because it is obvious that E(R, p′0, p
′
1) = 0 for R ≥ 1− H(p
′
0)+H(p
′
1)
2 , we assume
R < 1− H(p′0)+H(p′1)2 in Section B.1.
First, we consider the case H(q0)+H(q1)2 < 1−R. If we set
q∗0 =
√
p′0√
p′0 +
√
1− p′0
,
q∗1 =
√
p′1√
p′1 +
√
1− p′1
,
then we have
∂F (R,q0,q
∗
1 )
∂q0
∣∣∣
q0=q∗0
= 0,
∂F (R,q∗0 ,q1)
∂q1
∣∣∣
q1=q∗1
= 0, and ∂
2F (R,q0,q1)
∂q20
>
0, ∂
2F (R,q0,q1)
∂q21
> 0 for 0 ≤ q0, q1 ≤ 1. Thus, if H(q
∗
0 )+H(q
∗
1 )
2 < 1 − R, then
F (R, q0, q1) takes the minimum at (q
∗
0 , q
∗
1) and we have
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) = 1−R− log{
√
p′0 +
√
1− p′0} − log{
√
p′1 +
√
1− p′1}.
Next, we consider the case
H(q∗0 )+H(q
∗
1 )
2 ≥ 1−R. F (R, q0, q1) takes the mini-
mum in the range H(q0)+H(q1)2 ≥ 1−R. Because we assumed R < 1−
H(p′0)+H(p
′
1)
2 ,
q0 and q1 must be q0 > p
′
0 or q1 > p
′
1 in order to satisfy
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 ≥ 1 − R.
If q0 < p
′
0 and q1 > p
′
1, then
D(q0|p′0)+D(q1|p′1)
2 can be smaller by taking larger
q0 and smaller q1 while maintaining the condition
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 ≥ 1 − R. If
q0 > p
′
0 and q1 < p
′
1, then
D(q0|p′0)+D(q1|p′1)
2 can be smaller by taking larger q1
and smaller q0 while maintaining the condition
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 ≥ 1 − R. Thus, q0
and q1 must be q0 ≥ p′0 and q1 ≥ p′1 for D(q0|p
′
0)+D(q1|p′1)
2 to be the minimum.
Thus F (R, q0, q1) is minimum at (q0, q1) that satisfy
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 = 1−R. When
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 = 1−R, we can expand
D(q0|p′0)+D(q1|p′1)
2 as
D(q0|p′0) +D(q1|p′1)
2
=
1
2
{−q0 log p′0 − (1 − q0) log(1 − p′0)
−q1 log p′1 − (1− q1) log(1− p′1)−H(q0)−H(q1)}
=
1
2
{
log
1
p′0
− log 1
(1 − p′0)
}
q0 +
1
2
{
log
1
p′1
− log 1
(1− p′1)
}
q1
+
1
2
{
log
1
(1− p′0)
+ log
1
(1− p′1)
}
− (1−R). (18)
Because
dH(q0)
dq0
= log
1
q0
− log 1
(1− q0) ,
the tangent of the curve
H(q0) + H(q1)
2
= 1−R (19)
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at (qˆ0, qˆ1) is
1
2
{
log
1
qˆ0
− log 1
(1− qˆ0)
}
(q0 − qˆ0) + 1
2
{
log
1
qˆ1
− log 1
(1 − qˆ1)
}
(q1 − qˆ1) = 0.
As is shown in Eq. (18), the curve
D(q0|p′0) +D(q1|p′1)
2
= α (20)
is linear under the condition H(q0)+H(q1)2 = 1−R, and α takes the minimum at
the point where curve (19) and line (20) touch each other under the condition
H(q0)+H(q1)
2 = 1−R. Then, (qˆ0, qˆ1) satisfy{
log 1p′1
− log 1(1−p′1)
}
{
log 1p′0
− log 1(1−p′0)
} =
{
log 1qˆ1 − log 1(1−qˆ1)
}
{
log 1qˆ0 − log 1(1−qˆ0)
} ,
and we can further rewrite{
log
1
qˆ0
− log 1
(1− qˆ0)
}
= β
{
log
1
p′0
− log 1
(1 − p′0)
}
{
log
1
qˆ1
− log 1
(1− qˆ1)
}
= β
{
log
1
p′1
− log 1
(1 − p′1)
}
.
Thus, if we set
qˆ0 =
(p′0)
β
(p′0)β + (1− p′0)β
,
qˆ1 =
(p′1)
β
(p′1)β + (1− p′1)β
,
H(qˆ0) + H(qˆ1)
2
= 1−R,
then F (R, q0, q1) takes the minimum at (qˆ0, qˆ1). Because
dqˆ0
dβ < 0 and
dqˆ1
dβ < 0
for p′0 <
1
2 and p
′
1 <
1
2 , qˆ0 and qˆ1 are decreasing functions of β. Because we
assumed 1 − R > H(p′0)+H(p′1)2 , we have β < 1. If β < 12 , then
H(q∗0 )+H(q
∗
1 )
2 <
H(qˆ0)+H(qˆ1)
2 = 1 − R and F (R, qˆ0, qˆ1) takes the minimum at (q∗0 , q∗1). Thus,
1
2 ≤ β < 1.
Consequently, we can write E(R, p′0, p
′
1) as
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) =


1−R− log{√p′0 +√1− p′0} − log{√p′1 +√1− p′1}
for R < 1− H(q∗0 )+H(q∗1 )2
D(qˆ0|p′0)+D(qˆ1|p′1)
2
for 1− H(q∗0 )+H(q∗1 )2 ≤ R < 1−
H(p′0)+H(p
′
1)
2
0
for 1− H(p′0)+H(p′1)2 ≤ R.
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B.2 The minimum of E(R, p′0, p
′
1)
Next, we evaluate
min
0≤p′
0
≤p0
0≤p′
1
≤p1
E(R, p′0, p
′
1)
for arbitrary fixed rate R. If
H(q∗0 )+H(q
∗
1 )
2 < 1−R,
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) = 1−R− log{
√
p′0 +
√
1− p′0} − log{
√
p′1 +
√
1− p′1}. (21)
Eq. (21) is a decreasing function of p′0, p
′
1 for p
′
0 <
1
2 , p
′
1 <
1
2 , because if we set
f(p′0) =
√
p′0 +
√
1− p′0,
df(p′0)
dp′0
=
1
2
{
1√
p′0
− 1√
1− p′0
}
> 0
for p′0 <
1
2 and f(p
′
0) is an increasing function of p
′
0. If
H(q∗0 )+H(q
∗
1 )
2 ≥ 1 − R,
then
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) =
D(qˆ0|p′0) +D(qˆ1|p′1)
2
.
Assume E(R, p′0, p
′
1) takes the minimum at (p
′
0, p
′
1) with p
′
0 < p0. Because
p′0 < qˆ0, we define (p
′′
0 , p
′′
1) such that p
′
0 < p
′′
0 < qˆ0 and p
′
1 = p
′′
1 . Then
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) =
D(qˆ0|p′0) +D(qˆ1|p′1)
2
>
D(qˆ0|p′′0) +D(qˆ1|p′′1 )
2
≥ D(q˜0|p
′′
0) +D(q˜1|p′′1 )
2
= E(R, p′′0 , p
′′
1),
where
q˜0 =
(p′′0 )
β
(p′′0 )β + (1 − p′′0)β
q˜1 =
(p′′1 )
β
(p′′1 )β + (1 − p′′1)β
H(q˜0) + H(q˜1)
2
= 1−R.
Note that the first inequality is due to that p′′0 is closer to qˆ0 than p
′
0, and the
second inequality is due to that (q˜0, q˜1) is the point at which
D(q0|p′′0 )+D(q1|p′′1 )
2
takes the minimum. Thus, E(R, p′0, p
′
1) does not take the minimum at (p
′
0, p
′
1)
with p′0 < p0. In a similar manner, we can show that E(R, p
′
0, p
′
1) does not take
the minimum at (p′0, p
′
1) with p
′
1 < p1. Consequently, we have
min
0≤p′
0
≤p0
0≤p′
1
≤p1
E(R, p′0, p
′
1) = E(R, p0, p1).
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